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Abstract 
This paper uses the gravity model of trade to investigate the link between bilateral and 
multilateral foreign aid and exports. There are three primary findings from this approach. 
First, in the long term, the average return, in terms of an increase in the donor’s level of goods 
exports, is approximately $ 2.15 US for every aid dollar spent on bilateral aid. Second, 
multilateral aid has a positive effect on export levels only in the short term, whereas in the 
long term, the effect is negative. Third, aid from other donors does not give rise to a 
displacement effect for a given donor-recipient trade relationship. This paper also makes 
comparisons among donors and finds that aid has a positive and significant effect on most 
donors’ export levels. 
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THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF GIVING AID IN TERMS OF DONORS’ 
EXPORTS  
Introduction 
In international trade theory, researchers have long studied the welfare implications of 
development aid for donors and recipient countries. The first public discussion of this topic 
was the Keynes-Ohlin debate in relation to the paradoxical effects of German reparations
1. 
Leontieff (1936) also raised the possibility of transfer paradoxes (foreign aid can be donor-
enriching and recipient-immiserizing). Since those preliminary discussion, the theoretical 
literature on transfer paradoxes has been extended to more general settings (Gale, 1974; 
Brecher and Bhagwati, 1981 and 1982; Bhagwati, Brecher, and Hatta, 1983 and 1984). The 
findings indicate that the paradoxes are still possible but, under certain conditions both donors 
and recipients can benefit from transfers. More recently, Djajic,  Lahiri, and Raimondos-
Moller (2004) studied the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of an 
intertemporal model of trade and considered the impact of aid on donor exports. They found 
that the net benefits of an aid transfer may change over time for both the donor and the 
recipient. Assuming economic and political stability in the recipient country, a temporary 
transfer of income in the first period improves Period One welfare of the recipient and lowers 
that of the donor. But in the presence of habit-formation effects, aid in Period One may serve 
to shift preferences of the recipient in favor of the donor’s export goods in Period Two. When 
the terms-of-trade effect associated with this shift is sufficiently large and the real rate of 
interest is sufficiently low, the second period welfare gain of the donor (at the expense of the 
recipient) overshadows its Period One loss. In addition, this transaction also results in a net 
increase in welfare of the recipient country if the real rate of interest used to discount the 
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Period Two loss is sufficiently high, making its present value smaller than the Period One 
gain. 
As stated above, development aid has an effect on donor’s exports and this effect is 
expected to be positive, according to trade theory. Surprisingly, only a few authors have 
analyzed the effect of aid on donor countries’ export levels from a multi-donor perspective 
(Nilsson, 1997; Lloyd, McGillivray, Morrissey, and Osei, 2000; Wagner, 2003; Nelson and 
Juhasz Silva, 2008). 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between development aid and 
donors’ exports. Three key questions are addressed. First, we ask to what extent donor 
countries benefit from bilateral and multilateral development aid, in terms of greater exports 
to the recipient countries. Second, we question to what extent a given bilateral commercial 
link, a donor-recipient, displaces other donors’ exports, generating a crowding-out effect. 
Finally, we examine and quantify the effect of development aid on each donor’s export levels. 
A major contribution of the paper lies in taking account of zero trade flows and firm 
heterogeneity and in using very recent panel data estimation techniques that provide 
consistent estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity and endogeneity of some right hand 
side variables. Specifically, we apply panel-FGLS, Gamma Maximum Likelihood, Poisson-
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood and Non-linear Least Squares estimation to a multiplicative 
model and also Difference- and System-GMM estimation to a dynamic linear model. 
Difference- and System GMM are especially apt to control  potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables (bilateral aid, multilateral, other donors’ aid). 
To summarize our main results, we find that the increase in the amount of donors’ 
exports flowing from donors’ aid in the long run is more moderate than in earlier studies: 
around a $2.15 US increase in exports for every aid dollar spent. The overall effect is 
remarkably robust, but oscillates over time.  It is always positive and declined in the late 
1990s.  We do not find evidence of a displacement effect; on the contrary, a higher amount of   4
aid given by other donors increases exports from a given donor to a specific recipient. 
Interestingly, the evidence indicates that aid from some donors is not export-enhancing, 
whereas for some others, the effect is strong and robust to several specifications. The effect is 
greater for some donors (Switzerland, Canada, Austria, and France). But for a number of 
donors, there is no such effect (Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and Greece). 
Section 2 summarizes the related literature and the theoretical framework. Section 3 
presents a description of the data. Section 4 presents the model specification, discusses the 
main results, and presents a number of robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 outlines some 
conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical  Framework 
In recent decades, extensive research effort has been devoted to investigating the effects of 
developmental assistance on the economic performance of the recipient countries and 
clarifying how aid can be used to promote exports from developing countries, the so-called 
“aid for trade” principle (Morrissey, 2006). Much less attention has been devoted to the 
reverse issue of quantifying the impact of aid on donors’ export revenues. A finding that aid 
flows promote exports from the donor countries would suggest that giving aid—if it also 
promotes development in the recipient country—can be a win-win situation for both parties 
and might also reduce taxpayer reluctance to devote resources to aid.  
Interestingly, the literature on aid allocation has found that bilateral aid also strongly 
depends upon economic circumstances in the donor country, such as government performance 
and the donor’s relative individual income (Chong and Gradstein, 2008). In this political-
economic model, a donor’s willingness to provide foreign aid is positively related to the 
citizens’ satisfaction with the donor government’s performance and to per capita income. A 
political-economic equilibrium exists where the median voter is decisive in determining the 
political outcome in terms of a majority-supported tax rate. Therefore, the aggregate amount   5
of foreign aid depends positively on the aggregate income in the donor economy and 
negatively on the degree of its inequality. While a donor’s exports are not explicitly 
considered in this model, increased exports are likely to lead to an increase in GDP and thus 
increase a country’s willingness to provide aid.   
Other contributions to the aid allocation literature suggest that aid flows depend 
strongly upon historical ties and strategic and economic interests, and are only weakly 
dependent upon poverty levels or the existence of democratic governance in recipient 
countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). In this aid allocation context, an important question to 
examine is whether exports to a particular country promote subsequent aid flows to that 
country. If that reverse causality were present, this would be an important finding, further 
questioning the motivation of donors when giving aid.   
Turning directly to studies that investigate the impact of aid on a donor country’s 
exports, Arvin and Baum (1997) and Arvin and Choudry (1997) evaluated the relationship 
between bilateral aid and bilateral exports with and without tying of the aid. They found that 
aid without tying was roughly as export-promoting as tied aid and explained this as being due 
to the effects of the recipient countries’ good will and/or parallel trade agreements and trade 
concessions. Accordingly, a formal tying of aid does not appear to provide additive benefits 
related to donor export levels (Jepma, 1991; Arvin and Baum, 1997; Arvin and Choudry, 
1997). Benefits for donors through tying are therefore usually insubstantial, whereas tying 
noticeably reduces the benefit of aid for recipients (Jepma, 1991; Wagner, 2003). 
Consequently, tying has been progressively reduced, partly due to pressure from the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee.  
A number of studies analyzed the aid-trade link relying on the gravity model of 
international trade. For example, a study done by Nilsson (1997) on the aid and trade 
relationship of EU countries and developing countries from 1975 to 1992 showed that $1.00   6
US-worth of aid increased exports by an average of $2.60 US for EU countries. Nilsson used 
a common intercept for all the EU countries, three-year averages, and a time trend. Studying 
the aid and trade relationship between OECD donors (especially Japan) and recipient 
countries, Wagner (2003), using pooled data for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 
computed the donor-country export-level impact of $1.00 US of aid to be approximately a 
$2.30 US return when using pooled OLS, whereas it was reduced to $0.73 US when fixed 
country effects were added. Correspondingly, we apply a gravity model of trade as a basic 
framework, below. Solid theoretical foundations that provide a consistent base for empirical 
analysis have been developed in the past three decades for this model (Anderson, 1979; 
Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 
2008).  
The major contribution of Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) was the appropriate 
modeling of trade costs to explain bilateral exports.  The AvW model has been recently 
extended to applications explicitly involving developed and less developed countries by 
Nelson and Juhasz Silva (2007). They present an extension of AvW to the asymmetric north-
south case and derive some implications related to the effect of aid on trade. Their results 
indicate that if the economy of a donor country (GDP) is larger than that of the recipient 
country by at least the monetary value of the foreign aid, there is an increase in exports from 
the larger country to the smaller. The intuitive rationale behind this effect is that, as a result of 
the transfer, the two countries become more similar in size, and the more similar in size two 
countries are, the more they trade with one another.  
In our own study, we extend the literature by using more recent data, additional 
covariates (multilateral aid, exchange rates), and more advanced econometric techniques, in 
line with Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, Klasen and Larch (2009). In particular, we 
follow Nilsson (1997) and Wagner (2003) in using an augmented gravity model which is well 
suited to studying the impact of aid on trade. We depart from these authors in the way we   7
control for unobserved heterogeneity and zero trade flows. This model allows controlling for 
the impact of other influences on trade, such as income (which affects production capacity 
and preferences for variety), population (absorption and economies-of-scale effects), and 
distance, in a world where common language, colonial ties, common borders, and aid can also 
influence trade. We augment the model by exchange rates and two types of aid—bilateral and 
multilateral.  
 
3. Description of the Data 
3.1 Development Aid 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the section of the OECD which 
deals with development-cooperation matters. It comprises 22 donor countries.. Total aid given 
(TOF=total official flows) by its members is reported as official development aid (ODA) and 
other official flows (OOF). The data contain the bilateral transactions, as well the multilateral 
contributions. The bilateral transactions are undertaken by a donor country directly with an 
aid recipient and the multilateral contributions are contributions of international agencies and 
organizations. The recipients include not only countries and territories, but also multilateral 
organizations that are also ODA eligible. 
The total net ODA disbursements is the sum of grants, capital subscriptions, total net 
loans, and other long-term capital. The grants include debt forgiveness and interest subsidies 
in associated financing packages. The capital subscriptions to multilateral organizations are 
made in the form of notes and similar instruments unconditionally redeemable on sight by the 
recipient institutions. The total net loans and other long-term capital represent the loans 
extended, minus repayment received, and with the offsetting of entries for debt relief. 
Technical cooperation, development food aid, and emergency aid are included in grants and 
gross loans.   8
OOF are other official sector transactions which do not meet ODA criteria, for 
example, grants to aid recipients for representational or essentially commercial purposes, 
official loans intended to promote development but having a grant element of less than 25 
percent, or official bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily 
export-facilitating in purpose. This category includes by definition export credits extended 
directly to an aid recipient by an official agency or institution ("official direct export credits"). 
Net acquisitions by governments and central monetary institutions of securities issued by 
multilateral development banks at market terms, subsidies (grants) to the private sector to 
soften its credits to aid recipients, and funds in support of private investment are also 
classified as OOF. The effect of direct export credits on donors’ exports has been recently 
investigated for Austria by Egger and Url (2006). 
The multilateral contributions of international agencies and organizations (also part of 
ODA) can be imputed back to the funders of those bodies. The OECD uses a specific 
methodology that we briefly explain.  The approach will vary, depending upon whether the 
intention is to show the share of the receipts of a given recipient attributable to a particular 
donor or the share of a given donor’s outflows that can be assigned to an individual recipient. 
As DAC statistics are primarily designed to measure donor effort, the second approach is the 
one taken in DAC statistical presentations. First, the percentage of each multilateral agency’s 
total annual gross disbursements that each recipient country receives is calculated. This 
calculation is carried out only in respect to agencies’ disbursements of grants or concessional 
(ODA) loans from core resources. Then, the recipient percentages derived in the first step are 
multiplied by a donor's contribution in the same year to the core resources of the agency 
concerned to arrive at the imputed flow from that donor to each recipient. This calculation is 
repeated for each multilateral agency. The results from the second step for all agencies are 
added to obtain the total imputed multilateral aid from each donor to each recipient country.    9
In practice, imputed multilateral percentages are calculated for about 20 agencies per 
year. These account for about 90 percent of donors’ multilateral ODA. Core contributions to 
the remaining agencies, for which the OECD does not have outflow data, are not imputed 
back to donors. Therefore, imputed multilateral ODA remains slightly lower than donors’ 
total contributions to multilateral aid. Total imputed multilateral flows, in combination with 
bilateral ODA, are assumed to provide the most complete picture possible of the total ODA 
effort the donor is making with respect to individual recipient countries. At present, there is 
no regular imputation of multilateral ODA flows by sector or other aid parameters, though 
this has been done occasionally in the context of sectoral studies (e.g., on aid to the water 
sector, to basic social services, or in support of HIV/AIDS control). Finally, it is worth noting 
as well that any methodology for imputing multilateral flows can only be an approximation 
because multilateral flows in a given year are not precisely imputable to donors’ contributions 
in that year.  
Figure 1 shows the ratio of ODA over GDP for the most important donors from 1988 
through 2006. The Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, and Finland) and the Netherlands 
show the highest figures. Throughout this entire period, they consistently gave more than 
0.6% of GDP as ODA and in some years the percentage surpassed 1 percent for the 
Netherlands. The USA presents the lowest figures showing percentages that are in many years 
below 0.2 percent of GDP. 
Figure 1. Donor’s ODA-to-GDP ratio (1988-2006) 
Figures 2 and 3 show the five largest recipients and the five largest donors in the 1980 
to 2004 period. Egypt is the largest recipient, followed by Russia in the case of total official 
flows (TOF=ODA+OOF), and China with the ODA total net. With respect to TOF, China   10
appears in the fourth place. Indonesia appears at the third place and Israel takes the fourth 
place on ODA and the fifth on TOF. In the fifth position is Vietnam in terms of ODA. 
Figure 2. Five largest recipients (1980-2004) 
With respect to the largest donors (Figure 3), the United States and Japan keep the first 
position, followed by France and Germany. The United Kingdom ranks in fifth place with 
respect to total official flows and Italy is in fifth place with respect to ODA total net flows.  
Figure 3. Five largest donors (1980-2004) 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
The datasets used are the following: ODA data from 1988 to 2004 are from the OECD 
Development Database on Aid from DAC Members. We consider bilateral gross ODA 
disbursements in current US$
2, instead of aid commitments, because we are interested in the 
funds actually released to the recipient countries in a given year. Disbursements record the 
actual international transfer of financial resources, or the transfer of goods or services valued 
at the cost to the donor. We also consider imputed multilateral aid as a proxy for donors’ total 
contributions to multilateral aid. 
The original DAC member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Other countries are also included in the data, but they became a donor many years 
later: the Czech Republic (1998), Greece (1996), Hungary (2003), Iceland (1988), Korea 
(1989), Latvia (2002), Lithuania (2001), the Slovak Republic, Spain (1987), and Turkey 
(1990). In the empirical estimations we included all original DAC countries plus Greece and 
Spain. Bilateral exports are obtained from the UN COMTRADE database. Data on income 
and population variables are drawn from the World Bank (World Development Indicators 
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Database, 2007). Bilateral exchange rates are from the IMF statistics. Distances between 
capitals have been computed as Great Circle distances using data on straight-line distances in 
kilometers, latitudes, and longitudes from the CIA World Fact Book. Other dummy variables 
included in the model are from CEPII. 
4. Model Specification and Main Results 
4.1 Model Specification 
The gravity model of trade is nowadays the most commonly accepted framework to 
model bilateral trade flows (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). According to the underlying theory, trade 
between two countries is explained by nominal incomes and the populations of the trading 
countries, by the distance between the economic centers of the exporter and importer, and by 
a number of trade impediment and facilitation variables. Dummy variables, such as trade 
agreements, common language, or a common border, are generally used to proxy for these 
factors. The gravity model has been widely used to investigate the role played by specific 
policy or geographical variables in explaining bilateral trade flows. Consistent with this 
approach, and in order to investigate the effect of development aid on donors’ exports, we 
augment the traditional model with bilateral and multilateral aid (ODA). Among the variables 
facilitating trade, we add bilateral and imputed multilateral aid. Introducing time variation and 
bilateral exchange rates
3, the augmented gravity model is specified as 
ijt ijt ij itj ijt ij jt it jt it ijt u EXCHR F MAID BAID DIST YH YH Y Y X
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0
α α α α α α α α α α = ,   (1)                   
 
where Xijt are the exports from donor i to recipient j in period t in current US$; Yit (Yjt) 
indicates the GDPs of the exporter (importer) in period t, YHit (YHjt) are exporter (importer) 
GDPs per capita in period t, DISTij is geographical distances between countries i and j, and Fij 
                                                           
3 When the gravity model is estimated using panel data, it is recommended to add bilateral exchange rates, as 
well, as a control variable (Carrere, 2006).   12
denotes other factors impeding or facilitating trade (e.g., trade agreements, common language, 
a colonial relationship, or a common border). BAIDGijt is bilateral official gross development 
aid from donor i to country j in current US$; and MAIDijt is imputed multilateral development 
aid from donor i to country j in current US$; EXCHRijt denotes nominal bilateral exchange 
rates in units of local currency of country i (donor) per unit of currency in country j (recipient) 
in year t. Finally, uijt is an idiosyncratic error term that is assumed to be well behaved. Note 
that aid variables could be inserted with lags, in accordance with the theoretical predictions. 
The number of lags will be determined with Hendry’s general-to-specific methodology. 
Usually the model is estimated in log-linear form
4. Taking logarithms in Equation 1, 
the specification of the gravity model is 
 
ijt ijt ij ijt
ijt ij jt it jt it ij t ijt
LEXCHR F LMAID
LBAID LDIST LYH LYH LY LY LX
η α α α
α α α α α α δ φ γ
+ + + +
+ + + + + + + + + =
9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
 
                          ( 2 )  
where L denotes variables in natural logs and the other explanatory variables are 
described above.  t φ  are specific time effects that control for omitted variables common to all 
trade flows but which vary over time. ij δ  are trading-partner unobservable effects that proxy 
for multilateral resistance factors. When these effects are specified as fixed effects, the 
influence of the variables that are time invariant cannot be directly estimated. This is the case 
for distance; therefore, its effect is subsumed into the country dummies. Finally, ηijt is an 
idiosyncratic error term that is assumed to be well behaved. The model will be estimated for 
all donors and also for each donor separately by restricting the income and income-per-capita 
coefficients to being equal (α1 =α2 and α3=α4).  
 
                                                           
4 We also estimate the model in its original multiplicative form.   13
As an additional control variable, we use aid from other donors (different from donor i 
to recipient j ( ∑LBAIDkjt). The rationale of adding this variable is to control for cross-
correlation effects due to the fact that other donors’ aid could promote their own exports to 
recipient j, which may have a negative effect on donor i ‘s exports.   
Considering that it may take some time before aid fully affects trade, we include a 
number of lags of the two types of aid (bilateral and imputed multilateral) in the model 
specification. To determine the number of lags added to the right-hand side, we follow the 
general-to-specific methodology. We start by adding more lags than one could reasonably 
expect to need and then disregard those that are statistically non-significant. The chosen 
number of lags is two for bilateral aid and one for imputed multilateral aid.  
With respect to the specification of the country-pair effects, we not only considered 
the usual fixed-versus-random-effects approach, but also an alternative approach, which is 
especially suitable when there are missing values and the time span is short, and  consists of 
estimating the model, as proposed by Mundlak (1978), including within and between effects 
(Egger and Url, 2006). 
ijt ij ij
ij ij ij ij ij ijt ij
ijt ijt ij jt it jt it t ijt
AVLEXCHR AVLAMULTI
AVLODAGD AVLYHR AVLYHD AVLYR AVLYD LEXCHR F
LMAID LBAID LDIST LYH LYH LY LY LX
η α α
α α α α α α α
α α α α α α α φ γ
+ +
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + =
16 15
14 13 12 11 10 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
           (3) 
 
To continue our analysis we consider a modification to the previous specification that 
includes country-and-time effects to account for time-variant, multilateral price terms, as 
proposed by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007). As stated by 
Baldwin and Taglioni, including time-varying country dummies should completely eliminate 
the bias stemming from the “gold-medal error” (the incorrect specification or omission of the 
terms that Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) called multilateral trade resistance). The main 
shortcoming of this approach is that it involves estimation of 2NT (N=donors+recipients, T=   14
years) dummies for unidirectional trade, in our case, 5,202 dummies. Nevertheless, within the 
panel, we have 2DRT observations (D=donors, R=recipients), and with N and T relatively 
large (152 and 17, respectively), there remain many degrees of freedom.  
The new specification which accounts for the multilateral price terms in a panel data 
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5 4 3 2 1  
                    ( 4 )  
where 
σ − 1
it P and 
σ − 1
jt P are time-variable, multilateral (price) resistant terms that will be proxied 
with 2NT country and time dummies, and εijt denotes the error term that is assumed to be well 
behaved. The other variables are the same as in Equation 2, above. Income and income-per-
capita variables cannot be estimated because they are collinear with the exporter and time 
variables and importer and time multilateral resistance terms. 
A third alternative specification is based on Helpman et al. (2008). The authors 
developed a two-stage estimation procedure that uses a selection equation in the first stage 
and a trade-flow equation in the second. They showed that the traditional estimates are biased 
and that the bias is primarily due to the omission of the extensive margin (number of 
exporters), rather than to selection into trade partners. In line with Helpman et al. (2008), we 
also estimate the proposed system of equations.  The first equation specifies a latent variable 
that is positive only if country i exports to country j. The second equation specifies the log of 
bilateral exports from country i to country j as a function of standard variables (income, 
distance, common language), dyadic random effects, and a variable, ωijt, that is an increasing 
function of the fraction of country i  firms that export to country j.  The resulting equations 
are 
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ijt ij ijt ij ijt ijt
ij jt it jt it t ijt ijt
LEXCHR F LMAID LBAID
LDIST LYH LYH LY LY X P
η ς θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ ζ θ ρ
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + + = =
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0 ) (
  (5)
ijt ij ijt ij ijt ijt
ij jt it jt it t ijt ijt
LEXCHR F LMAID LBAID
LDIST LYH LYH LY LY LX
µ υ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ φ ω α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + =
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
            (6) 
where ςij and υij are dyadic country-pair effects (specified as random in equation 5) to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity, and φt and ζt denote time-specific effects.  
The new variable, ωijt, is an inverse function of firm productivity. The error terms in 
both equations are assumed to be normally distributed. Clearly, the error terms in both 
equations are correlated. Helpman et al. (2008) construct estimates of the ωijts using predicted 
components of Equation 5. They propose a second stage non-linear estimation that corrects 
for both sample-selection bias and firm heterogeneity bias. They also decompose the bias and 
find that correcting only for firm heterogeneity addresses almost all the biases in the standard 
gravity equation. They implement a simple linear correction for unobserved heterogeneity 
( ijt ω ), proxied with a transformed variable (
* ˆijt z ) given by, 
) ˆ ( ˆ
1 *
ijt ijt z ρ φ








*  and φ (.) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the unit-normal 
distribution.  ijt ρ ˆ  is the predicted probability of exports from country i to country j, using the 
estimates from the random-effects-panel-probit Equation 5. We also decompose the bias and 
used the inverse Mills ratio as a proxy for sample selection and the linear prediction  of 
exports down-weighted by its standard error as a proxy for firm heterogeneity ( ijt ω ), both 
obtained from Equation 5. 
The inverse Mills ratio is given by   16
µ σ ρ λ ijt ijt ijt =             ( 8 )  
where  ) , ( ijt ijt corr µ η ρ =  and 
µ σ ijt is the standard error of the residuals in Equation 6. 
The main difference between the Heckman and the  Helpman et al. (2008) procedures is the 
inclusion of  ( ijt ω ) as a proxy for firm heterogeneity in the Helpman et al. (2008) procedure, 
since the inverse Mills ratio ( ijt λ ), also called non-selection hazard, is included in both 
approaches as a way to correct for selection of firms into export markets. 
Finally, as stated by recent research, it is commonly accepted that the underlying data-
generating process of the gravity model of trade is a dynamic process. The existence of sunk 
costs borne by exporters to set up distribution and service networks in foreign markets 
generates persistency in exports; hence, a country exporting to another country in a given year 
will tend to continue doing so the year after. There have been different approaches in the 
recent literature trying to deal with this issue. The most commonly used approach has been to 
specify a model that includes lagged exports as an additional regressor in the gravity equation 
(De Grauwe and Skudelny, 2000; Egger, 2001; Bun and Klaasen, 2002; Martínez-Zarzoso 
and Nowak-Lehmann D., 2003; De Nardis and Vicarelli, 2004; De Benedictis, De Santis and 
Vicarelli, 2005; Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, and Horsewood, 2009). The dynamic 
models will be estimated via difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system GMM 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
In the next section, the outlined approaches are considered in order to validate our 
results. We will start with the static approaches (the two-stage Helpman approach and the 
Mundlak approach and some baseline models (OLS, FE (fixed effects) model)) and then 
proceed with dynamic models.  
4.2. Main Results 
Model 2 is estimated for data on 21 donors’ exports and development aid (ODA) to 
132 recipient countries during the period of 1988 to 2004. Table 2 reports the baseline   17
estimation results for the static models. The first and second columns show the pooled OLS 
(only for comparative purposes). Time-fixed effects are also included in both columns. 
Individual (country-pair) effects (modeled as random) are included in Column 3 to control for 
unobservable heterogeneous effects across trading partners, a Wald test indicates that the 
individual effects are jointly significant. Those effects have frequently been used as a proxy 
for the so-called “multilateral resistance” factors modeled by Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003).  
Table 2: Development Aid and Donors’ Exports—Linear Models 
Since a Hausman test indicates that the dyadic FE are correlated with the error term, 
the fourth column presents the two-way FE estimates. Since we are interested in explaining 
both the within and the between-within variation, we re-estimate the model following the 
methodology proposed by Mundlak (1978). Each time-variant variable is included twice, once 
in its original form and once averaged over time. FGLS on this model obtains both within 
effects and the  between-within effects in a single model. According to Egger and 
Pfaffermayer (2004), the former approximate short-run effects, and the latter additional long-
run effects. The results are shown in Column 5 (Table 2). As expected, the within-coefficients 
on bilateral and multilateral aid are practically unchanged with respect to those in the FE 
specification (Column 4). 
Since our data consists of a time span of a maximum of 17 years and a cross-section of 
132 countries, we tested for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The results 
of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test for 
heteroskedasticity indicate that both problems are present in the data. Hence, given the strong 
rejection of the null in both tests, the Mundlak-type-model is re-estimated with a random-
effects-FGLS model with a more flexible structure in the error term that allows for panel-
specific variances and for first order autocorrelation; the results are shown in Column 6   18
(Table 2). This is our preferred static specification. A RESET-type test indicates that the 
model is correctly specified (last row in Table 2). 
With respect to the variables of interest and bilateral aid, the estimated within-
coefficient is always positive and significant, indicating that a one-percent increase in aid 
raises donors’ exports by 0.068 percent (0.041+0.019+0.008). The effect is small compared to 
that shown in previous studies which did not control for individual effects, autocorrelation, 
and heteroskedasticity, but it is still positive and significant. Using the results in Column 6, 
we find that, in the short run, the average return on aid for donors’ exports is approximately a 
$0.80 US increase in exports for every aid dollar spent. This average is calculated as 
 
   
 
The fixed effects results obtained by Wagner (2003) implied that exports derived from 
a dollar of aid amount to $0.73 US for a sample of 20 donors, 108 recipients, and five years 
(1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990). This result, in the context of a static gravity model, is 
close to ours ($0.80 US using the coefficients of Model 6 in Table 2). However, Wagner did 
not control for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error term and our results show 
that controlling for it slightly reduces the estimated elasticity. 
It is worth noting that the between-effect (the coefficient obtained for bilateral aid 
averaged over time) is much larger in magnitude (0.151) than the within effect, and 
considering that it could be  taken as an approximation of the long-run effect, using this result, 
the average return on aid for donors’ exports in the long term is approximately a $1.78 US 
increase in exports for every aid dollar spent. 
 The estimated coefficient for the official gross development aid of other donors is also 
positive and statistically significant, but the magnitude is very low (0.022). This suggests that 
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other donors give higher amounts of aid to a particular recipient, the direct income effect 
could promote the recipient imports generating an indirect positive effect on a specific 
donor’s exports.  
With respect to imputed multilateral aid, the within-effect on donors’ exports is always 
positive and significant once we control for unobserved heterogeneity. According to Model 5, 
an increase of 10 percent in multilateral aid increases exports by 0.54 (0.032+0.022) percent. 
However, the between-effect is negative signed and statistically significant at the one-percent 
level, indicating that imputed multilateral aid only has a small and positive short-run impact 
on bilateral exports, but in the long-run, this effect is reversed. 
Most of the other variables present the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
The within-coefficient of donor income is negative and significant, indicating that higher 
income is associated with lower exports to developing countries in the short-run, but the 
between-effect is positive and significant.  The within-coefficient of recipient income is non-
significant but the between-effect is positive and significant, indicating that increases in 
recipients’ income foster imports from developed countries in the long-run. 
The within-coefficient of donors’ and recipient’s income per capita are both positive 
and statistically significant at the one-percent level in Model 6. The coefficient estimate for 
exporter’s per capita income is interpreted by Bergstrand (1989) as a proxy for the exporter’s 
K/L ratio. It may be positive signed if exports are dominated by capital-intensive industries. 
The coefficient of the importer per capita income has also an ambiguous sign; it may 
be negative when the products imported are necessities and positive when they are luxuries 
(Bergstrand, 1989). In the FGLS estimations the distance coefficient is around unity and takes 
the expected negative value.  
Table 3 provides results including time-varying nation dummies (Equation 4). 
According to Baier and Bersgtrand (2007) and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), the estimates in 
Table 3 should be unbiased, since the multilateral price variables are correctly modelled. The   20
two-way fixed effect within-estimator with robust standard errors has been used. Equation 4 is 
estimated for three different five-year periods. Now only the level and the first lagged ODA 
variables enter the model, since the second lag of ODA was not statistically significant. The 
same applies to ODA from other donors and the first lag of imputed multilateral ODA that are 
always not significant at conventional levels. 
Table 3:  Linear Model Results with Well-Specified Multilateral Resistance Terms 
The results indicate that bilateral ODA has also a positive effect on donors’ exports, 
but the effect does materialize in both the same and the previous period. The sum of the 
estimated coefficients for the level and first lag of bilateral ODA is very stable over time and 
within the interval (0.058-0.064). Compared with the results obtained in Table 2 (Model 6), 
the results are very similar (0.068). However, the coefficient on imputed multilateral donors’ 
aid is now non-significant, whereas it was positive and significant in Models 3 through 6 in 
Table 2. Assuming that adding time-varying nation dummies is an alternative way of 
capturing history, the results are also consistent with the fact that the between-coefficient of 
imputed multilateral aid is negative in Model 6 (Table 2).  
To account for selection bias and firm heterogeneity (Helpman et al., 2008), Table 4 
presents the results from estimating Equations 5 and 6, first with pair and time effects and 
considering only selection effects, showing the results in the first two columns of Table 4, and  
second, considering selection effects and firm heterogeneity, with the results given in columns 
3 and 4. In the first-step estimation (column 3), we estimate a random-effects probit model 
with exporter and importer fixed effects and time effects (Equation 5). From these estimates 
we obtained the linear predictions down-weighted by their standard error (ZHAT) and the 
inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS). These two elements were incorporated as regressors in the 
second-step estimations (column 4), for which we first estimated a gravity model with pair 
and time fixed effects (Equation 6), then adding the inverse Mills ratio that is a proxy for firm   21
selection. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 incorporate into the second-step estimation firm 
heterogeneity and self-selection effects, along with random effects and time dummies. The 
ZHAT coefficient is positive signed and statistically significant at the 10-percent level, and 
the INVMILLS coefficient is not statistically significant, showing no evidence of selection 
effects. The coefficients obtained in Column 4 (Table 4) are comparable to those in the 
random-effects specification in Column 3 (Table 2). We  observe that the total effect of 
bilateral aid on exports is now (0.139), whereas previously it was 0.088. Hence, disregarding 
firm heterogeneity slightly biases the estimates downwards. 
Table 4: Results Heckman Selection Model and Helpman et al. Model 
Next, we estimate a dynamic gravity model following the standard technique of 
adding lagged dependent variables as regressors. The results for two different sub-periods are 
presented in Table 5.  
Table 5. Dynamic Specifications 
The first two columns in this table present the results obtained by following a 
differenced-GMM approach for two different periods (1988-1996 and 1997-2004), while 
Columns 3 and 4 present the results obtained when estimating by the system GMM approach.  
This second method is commonly accepted as one of the best ways  to estimate the 
determinants of bilateral export flows in a dynamic context. The results concerning the 
variable of interest obtained in Columns 3 and 4 are consistent with those obtained in Model 6 
(Table 2), above. Indeed, the average return on aid for donors’ exports in the long term, 
calculated using the average of the long term aid coefficients in both periods, is 
approximately a $2.15 US increase in exports for every aid dollar spent, which is slightly 
higher than the estimate found in the static model ($ 1.78 US).  
4.3 Robustness Checks   22
As a first robustness check, the gravity model is also estimated in its original 
multiplicative form within the framework of generalized linear models (GLM). These models 
allow for a more flexible specification of the variance and the mean and deal with the 
problems of heteroskedasticity and zero values in the dependent variable simultaneously. The 
main results are presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The main difference with respect to 
the estimated elasticities of exports with respect to bilateral aid is that the results, in terms of 
bilateral aid, our variable of interest, indicate even higher returns in terms of exports. 
According to the Gamma family (which is the best model in terms of AIC and BIC) the 
elasticity of exports with respect to bilateral aid is 0.186, indicating that a 10-percent increase 
in aid increases exports by 1.86 percent. However the coefficient on multilateral aid is 
negative and significant. 
As a second robustness check, we tested for endogeneity of bilateral aid and for non-
linearities in a static and dynamic setting. Results are shown in the Appendix (Table A.3). Aid 
is found to be exogenous (last row of Table A.3) and the squared coefficient of bilateral aid  
reinforces the effect of aid. 
Finally, in order to account for possible heterogeneity of the estimated coefficients across 
donors, we estimated separated regressions for each donor. Table 6 shows the results for the 
Mundlak estimator. The effects of bilateral aid on exports vary among donors, with Norway, 
Canada, France, Austria, and Australia showing the greatest effects. It was also found that for 
six countries—Ireland, Greece, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland—such 
effect is not statistically significant. Greece and Ireland began giving aid in the 1990s and so 
the number of observations for them is lower than that for other donors.  
Table 6: Development Aid and Donors’ Exports—Results for Each Donor   23
Table 7 presents the monetary return on aid from single donors’ exports. One US 
dollar spent on aid generates more than one dollar of exports for Australia, Austria, Canada, 
France, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. The highest return is found for Norway. 
 Table 7: Return On Aid from Donors’ Exports 
We also run single-donor regressions using alternative estimators. According to the 
results of the two-way FE within estimator
5, the average effect, calculated as the average of 
the estimated coefficients in single donor regressions, is similar to the one found using 
alternative estimators and is close to the average effect obtained in Model 6 (Table 2). A 
dynamic specification, with lagged exports added as explanatory variable, was also estimated, 
but in half of the cases, the coefficient of lagged exports was not statistically significant
6.  
In summary, our results indicate that in the short term, the average return on aid 
for donors’ exports is approximately a $0.80 US dollar increase in exports for every aid 
dollar spent, whereas in the long run, this number is even larger. According to the results 
obtained from the dynamic model, the long run average return on aid for donors’ exports 
is around $ 2.15 US-dollar increase in exports for every aid dollar spent. 
If all donors will follow the Millennium Development Goals’ recommendations 
and spend 0.07 percent of their GDP on developmental aid, they will achieve two goals: 
first, they can increase their export levels, and second, they will contribute to the 
economic development of poor countries and to the improvement in the living conditions 




                                                           
5 Results are available upon request from the authors. 
6 Results are available upon request from the authors.   24
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of development aid on donors’ 
exports. The study period runs from 1988 to 2004. The main results can be summarized 
as follows. First, donors’ bilateral aid has positively affected their exports to developing 
countries. The results point to large beneficial effects of bilateral aid upon donor’s 
exports and to non-negligible effects of imputed multilateral aid in the short term.   
Second, the effects of bilateral aid on exports vary among donors, with Austria, 
Australia, Canada, France and Norway showing the greatest positive effects. Third, a 
particular donor’s export levels to aid recipients are not, as was previously found in the 
literature, negatively  affected if other donors increase their aid. Fourth, and finally, the 
effects of aid on donors’ exports do not appear to have grown  over the period studied.    25
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Figure 2. Five Largest Recipients 
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Source: OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) online databases on aid.   27
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
       
VARIABLE Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
       
LXDON  37336  16.154  2.882 3.912 25.511 
LYD  47124  26.671 1.293  24.307 30.086 
LYR  39606  23.693 1.831  19.260 29.665 
LYHD  47124  9.985 0.273 9.185 10.589 
LYHR  39606  7.917 0.929 5.956 10.102 
LD  46030  8.341 0.579 5.158 9.376 
LODAGD  34696  0.667 2.468 -4.605  9.326 
LAMULTI  41036 -0.268 2.026  -4.605 6.705 
       
VARIABLE Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
       
XDON1000  37336 243336.9  1984338  0.05 1.20E+08 
YD1000  47124 9.76E+08 1.79E+09 3.60E+07 1.17E+10 
YR1000  39606 1.22E+08 4.56E+08 231408.6 7.64E+09 
YHD1000  47124 22.50278 5.933512  9.747  39.676 
YHR1000  39606 4.155313 4.047395  0.386  24.382 
D  46030 4829.588 2344.654  173.826 11796.54 
ODAGD1000  34784 20628.56 115763.2  -63440 1.12E+07 
AMULTI1000  47124 3618.673 12334.67  -55340  816630 
       
       
Note: The period considered is 1988-2004. L indicates natural logarithms and 1000 indicates thousand US$; 
XDON denotes bilateral donors’ exports at current prices, YD and YR are donors’ and recipients’ GDPs, 
respectively; YHD and YHR and are donors’ and recipients’ GDPs per capita, respectively; LD is distance; 
ODAGD is gross bilateral aid from donor i to country j; and AMULTI is imputed multilateral aid to country j.    29
Table 2: Development aid and donors’ exports—linear models 
  OLS ,t  OLS, t  RE, t  Fe, t  Mundlak, t  Mundlak, Het. Ar(1) 
  m1  m2  m3 m4 m5  m6 
LYD  0.839***  0.829*** 0.882***  1.374*  1.351***  -0.894*** 
  73.273  65.776 31.623  2.249  3.998  -3.478 
LYR  0.846***  0.859*** 0.807***  -0.476  -0.292*  -0.136 
  108.769  104.221 43.947  -1.855  -2.165  -0.959 
LYHD  0.008  -0.477*** -0.393***  -0.984  -1.011**  0.577* 
  0.094  -4.976  -4.181 -1.456 -2.667  2.094 
LYHR  0.537***  0.500***  0.657*** 1.671*** 1.656***  1.600*** 
  30.287  25.67 19.683  6.884  12.524  10.627 
LD  -1.087***  -1.077*** -1.155***    -1.195***  -1.034*** 
  -65.354  -61.393 -21.103    -21.520  -69.80 
LODAGDJ  -0.052***  -0.064***  0.045*** 0.071*** 0.049***  0.022*** 
  -4.542  -5.241  3.619 4.022 3.918  3.323 
LODAGD  0.190***  0.064***  0.054*** 0.048*** 0.047***  0.041*** 
  34.620  5.637  9.185 6.755 7.962  12.019 
LODAGD(-1)    0.048*** 0.020***  0.016**  0.015*  0.019*** 
    3.873  3.295 2.603 2.426  5.346 
LODAGD(-2)    0.087*** 0.014*  0.007  0.007  0.008* 
    8.118  2.538 1.059 1.336  2.342 
LAMULTI  -0.056***  -0.042** 0.019*  0.023**  0.021**  0.032*** 
  -6.324  -3.053  2.422 2.723 2.658  7.515 
LAMULTI(-1)    -0.037** 0.022**  0.018*  0.023**  0.022*** 
    -2.666  2.852 2.289 2.947  5.336 
LEXCHR  0  0.001  0.003 0.003 0.002  0.001 
  0.087  0.139  0.777 0.374 0.614  0.156 
CONTIG  -0.476*    -0.638** -0.772    -0.599  -0.331 
  -2.29  -2.99 -0.954    -0.745  -1.597 
COMLANG  0.219***  0.169*** 0.256**    0.181  0.177*** 
  6.868  5.062 2.750    1.940  5.641 
COLONY  0.794***  0.744*** 0.922***    0.807***  0.714*** 
  18.979  17.196 6.318    5.435  19.462 
AVLYD        -0.412  1.758*** 
        -1.212  6.833 
AVLYR        1.150***  0.942*** 
        8.406  6.655 
AVLYHD        1.757***  -0.152 
        3.868  -0.523 
AVLYHR        -1.213***  -1.218*** 
        -8.300  -8.000 
AVLODAGD        0.161***  0.151*** 
        7.784  16.012 
AVLAMULTI        -0.254***  -0.265*** 
        -6.289  -18.495 
AVLEXCHR        0.021  0.007 
        0.574  0.570 
R-SQUARED  0.76  0.772  0.142 0.762 0.768   
N  18877  15556  15556 15732 15556  15493 
RMSE  1.2134  1.153  0.566 0.537 0.563   
RESET  0.000  0.000  0.518 0.251 0.107  0.260 
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices; LYD and LYR are donors’ and recipients’ 
GDPs, respectively; LYHD and LYHR are donors’ and recipients’ GDPs per capita, respectively; LD is distance;   30
LODAGDK is gross bilateral aid from other donors (different from i) to country j; LODAGD is gross bilateral 
aid from donor i to country j; and LAMULTI is imputed multilateral aid to country j. LEXCHR is the bilateral 
exchange rate at current prices; CONTIG, COMLANG, COLONY, COL45, and SMCTRY are dummies that 
take the value 1 when countries share a border and a language, have a colonial relationship, and had a colonial 
relationship before 1945, and when i and j were part of the same country in the past, respectively. Av denotes 
average values of the respective variables. t-statistics are reported.  
 
Table 3.  Linear model results with well-specified multilateral resistance terms 
With exporter-and-time and importer-and-time multilateral 
resistance terms and dyadic fixed effects 
Period  1988-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
  m1     m2  m3 
LODAGD  0.039*** 0.025**     0.037**   
  3.402 1.980 2.900 
LODAGD (-1)  0.026**    0.035**   0.021* 
  2.231 2.789 1.654 
LODAGD (-2)  0.003        -          - 
  0.252         -         - 
LAMULTI  0.0200 0.032  0.014 
  0.79 1.406  0.486 
LAMULTI (-1)  0.029 0.053**      0.043 
  1.071 2.177 1.552 
LEXCHR  0.014 0.008 -0.056*     
  1.278 0.299 -2.54 
CONSTANT  16.513*** 16.697*** 16.712*** 
  212.776 130.605 166.262 
R-SQUARED  0.113 0.115 0.071 
NOBS  5128 5130 5212 
Log-Lik.  -2837.586 -2644.623 -2953.799 
RMSE  0.5130324 0.5038152 0.5310784 
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices, LODAGD is gross bilateral aid from donor i 
to country j, and LAMULTI is imputed multilateral aid to country j. LEXCHR is the bilateral exchange rate at 
current prices. t-statistics are reported. The variable representing aid from other donors is different from that for 
donor i (LODAGDj), and was non-significant in all the regressions.    31
 Table 4. Heckman selection model and Helpman et al. results 
Models:  Heckman  with X,M effects  Helpman et al.  
  First step  Second step  Probit-re  FGLS-het,psar(1) 
  xdon lxdon  xdon  lxdon 
LYD  15.740*** 1.072*  -0.111  0.871*** 
  9.762 2.141  -1.125  103.159 
LYR  0.366 -0.687***  0.491***  0.838*** 
  0.551 -3.506  7.424  142.226 
LYHD  -15.266*** -1.200*  2.501***  -0.292*** 
  -8.614 -2.135  5.451  -4.873 
LYHR  1.792** 2.065***  0.114  0.589*** 
  2.770 10.8  0.854  49.179 
LD  -0.221* -1.463***  -0.476** -0.999*** 
  -1.973 -54.233  -2.664  -77.693 
LODAGDJ  -0.329*** -0.040*  -0.188**  0.009 
  -5.01 -2.22  -3.076 1.629 
LODAGD  -0.062* 0.085***  -0.083** 0.059*** 
  -2.11 10.565  -2.608 26.514 
LODAGD (-1)  -0.082** 0.041***  -0.088**  0.048*** 
  -2.627 4.63  -2.692  22.049 
LODAGD (-2)  0.064* 0.043***  0.049  0.032*** 
  2.228 5.577  1.626  13.932 
LAMULTI  -0.054 0.017  -0.082  0.002 
  -1.298 1.544  -1.901  0.594 
LAMULTI (-1)  -0.007 0.013  -0.008  -0.003 
  -0.16 1.161  -0.2  -0.896 
LEXCHR  -0.005 -0.009  -0.018  -0.002 
  -0.262 -1.575  -0.899  -0.975 
CONTIG  3.869 1.055***  28.889 -0.395* 
  . 4.326  0  -2.313 
COMLANG  0.146 0.157***  0.352  0.161*** 
  1.384 5.743  1.331  6.787 
COLONY  0.352   0.868   
  1.614   1.367   
COL45  -0.018 1.062***  0.379  1.305*** 
  -0.067 23.877  0.522  35.576 
SMCTRY  3.837 0.399  25.34  0.23 
  . 1.325  0  1.421 
CONSTANT  -285.863 18.838*  -23.673***  -20.032*** 
  . 2.068  -4.339  -30.135 
NOBS  19000 15493  19000  15493 
MILLS      0.215**    ZHAT4  0.003    
   2.828    1.616        
     INVMILLS1  -0.031                
       -1.512                 
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices; LYD and LYR are donors’ and recipients’ 
GDPs, respectively; LYHD and LYHR are donors’ and recipients’ GDPs per capita, respectively; LD is distance; 
LODAGDK is gross bilateral aid from other donors (different from i) to country j; LODAGD is gross bilateral 
aid from donor i to country j; and LAMULTI is imputed multilateral aid to country j. LEXCHR is the bilateral 
exchange rate at current price; CONTIG, COMLANG, COLONY, COL45, and SMCTRY are dummies that take 
the value 1 when countries share a border and a language, have a colonial relationship, and had a colonial 
relationship before 1945, and when i and j were part of the same country in the past, respectively. t-statistics are 
reported.  
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Table 5. Dynamic Specifications 
   Difference GMM  System 
GMM 
  
   1988-1996  1997-2004  1988-1996  1997-2004 
LXDON(-1)  0.173* 0.214*** 0.758***  0.621*** 
   2.498 4.361  7.149  8.032 
LYD  0.752 -0.483  0.187* 0.322*** 
   0.355 -0.675  2.131  4.442 
LYR  -0.097 0.436  0.196*  0.331*** 
   -0.209 0.914  2.264  4.821 
LYHD  0.208 0.784  -0.127 -0.037 
   0.097 1.051  -1.019 -0.284 
LYHR  0.754 0.849  0.141* 0.208*** 
   1.563 1.907  2.445  4.136 
LODAGD  0.050*** 0.031***  0.057**  0.049*** 
   5.118 3.930  2.750  4.414 
LODAGDJ  0.072** -0.006  0.002  -0.036* 
   3.004 -0.275  0.127  -2.071 
LAMULTI  0.009 0.019  -0.004 -0.004 
   0.723 1.764  -0.349 -0.42 
LAMULTI (-1)  -0.018* 0.023*  -0.034***  -0.002 
   -2.193 2.378  -3.745  -0.17 
LEXCHR  0.003 0.006  0.002  0.008 
   0.257 0.378  0.308  0.642 
LD     -0.264*  -0.406*** 
      -2.174  -5.054 
COMLANG   0.01  0.130* 
      0.19  2.106 
COLONY     0.203  0.268** 
      1.66  2.676 
CONTIG       -1.40E-01 
        -0.381 
CONS     -3.249  -8.046** 
      -1.283  -3.178 
AR1  -6.25 -9.139  -7.057 -8.144 
AR2   0.449 1.612  2.031  2.712 
AR1(P)  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR2(P)  0.653 0.107  0.042  0.007 
HANSEN  29.376 39.221  29.221  51.040 
HANSEN (P)  0.343 0.148  0.255  0.094 
NUMBER OF 
INSTRUMENTS 
44 49  46  62 
LODAGD--Long 
Run Coeff. 
0.060 0.039  0.236  0.129 
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices; LYD and LYR are donors’ and recipients’ 
GDPs, respectively; LYHD and LYHR are donors’ and recipients’ GDPs per capita, respectively; LD is distance, 
LODAGDK is gross bilateral aid from other donors (different from i) to country j; LODAGD is gross bilateral 
aid from donor i to country j; and LAMULTI is imputed multilateral aid to country j. LEXCHR is the bilateral 
exchange rate at current prices,  CONTIG, COMLANG, and COLONY are dummies that take the value 1 when 
countries share a border or language or have a colonial relationship, respectively. t-statistics are reported.    33
 
 Table 6. Development aid and donors’ exports–results for each donor. (Mundlack 
approach) 
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices, LODAGD is gross bilateral aid from donor i 
to country j, and LAMULTI is imputed multilateral aid to country j. AVLODAGD is average aid. t-statistics are 
reported next to the estimated coefficients.  
 
 LODAGD    LODAGD 
(-1) 
  LAMULTI    LAMULTI 
(-1) 
  AVLODAGD   
Austria  0.059** 2.818 0.042**  2.12  -0.024  -1.004  0.041*  1.78  -0.071*  -1.891 
Belgium  0.016  1.155 0.003  0.209 0.004  0.188 0.023  1.116  0.047  1.356 
Denmark  0.038** 2.63  -0.004 -0.248  0.141*** 3.745 0.036  1.501  0.147***  4.561 
Finland     0.016 0.781  0.029  1.358  -0.001 -0.02  0.015  0.396  0.001  0.018 
France  0.074***  3.831 0.033* 1.678 0.018  1.236 0.004  0.312  0.519***  14.284 
Germany  0.031* 1.93 0.013 0.853  0.036** 2.837  0.01  0.784  0.240***  5.819 
Greece  0.033  0.961 -0.017 -0.527  0.056  1.325 0.081*  1.735  0.429***  5.841 
Ireland     -0.015 -0.457  -0.027  -0.909  0.012  0.273  0.037  0.924  0.117*  1.714 
Italy  0.022** 3.265 0.019**  2.871 0.027**  2.125 0.015  1.363  0.169***  6.334 
Netherl  0.013  1.202 -0.002 -0.16 0.027  1.166 -0.014  -
1.016 
0.001 0.042 
Portugal  0.056*  1.873 0.01  0.303 0.072  1.446 0.041  0.882  0.606***  9.569 
Spain     0.050*** 4.283  0.042***  3.78  -0.002  -0.121 0.003  0.149  0.168***  6.206 
Sweden  0.049** 3.167 0.039**  2.662 0.025  0.932 0.007  0.32  0.04  1.151 
UK  0.030** 2.965 0.025* 2.344 0.034**  2.744 0.015  1.183  0.318***  10.343 
Norway  0.124*** 4.055  0.059*  1.989  -0.037  -0.664 0.028  0.71 -0.068  -1.246 
Switzerland     0.032**    2.784 0.01  0.853 0.014  0.773 0.006  0.371  -0.095**    -3.152 
Australia  0.095*** 3.49  0.022  0.803  -0.021  -1.09  0.024  1.046  0.157*  2.235 
Japan  0.053***  4.058 0.019  1.455 0.019*  1.675 0.018  1.469  -0.454***  -8.437 
NewZealand  -0.018 -0.411  -0.02 -0.477  0.057  1.182 -0.025  -0.69  -0.187  -1.411 
Canada  0.094***  3.91 -0.004  -0.171  0.050** 2.33 0.027  1.099  -0.499*** -7.472 
US     0.02* 1.92  0.009  0.78  0.008  0.666  0  0.02  0.167*** 6.204 
Average 
Coeff  0.041   0.013   0.027   0.018    0.091 
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Table 7. Return on aid from donors’ exports (Mundlack aproach) 
Donors  LODAGD  LODAGD (-1)  Return $1 US Aid in 
$X 
Norway  0.124 0.059  2.937   
France  0.074 0.033  1.717   
Austria  0.059 0.042  1.621   
Australia  0.095 0.022  1.525   
Canada  0.094 -0.004  1.509   
Spain     0.050 0.042  1.476   
Sweden  0.049 0.039  1.412   
Portugal  0.056 0.010  0.899   
UK  0.030 0.025  0.883   
Japan  0.053 0.019  0.851   
Italy  0.022 0.019  0.658   
Denmark  0.038 -0.004  0.610   
Switzerland    0.032 0.010  0.514   
Germany  0.031 0.013  0.498   
US     0.020 0.009  0.321   
Belgium  0.016 0.003  0.257  ns 
Finland     0.016 0.029  0.257  ns 
Greece  0.033 -0.017  0.530  ns 
Netherlands  0.013 -0.002  0.209  ns 
New 
Zealand 
-0.018 -0.020  -0.610  ns 
Ireland     -0.015 -0.027  -0.674  ns 
Note: LODAGD is gross bilateral aid from donor i to country j. The return on aid is calculated using the results 
from Table 6 and taking into account only the estimates that are significant at the 1, 5 or 10% level. 
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List of Recipients (j) 132 List of Donors (i) 21
Afghanistan Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Peru Australia
Albania Congo, Rep. Jordan Philippines Austria
Algeria Costa Rica Kazakstan Qatar Belgium
Angola Cote d'Ivoire Kenya Rwanda Canada
Argentina Croatia Kiribati Samoa Denmark
Armenia Cuba Korea Saudi Arabia Finland
Aruba Djibouti Kuwait Senegal France
Azerbaijan Dominica Laos Dem. Rep. Seychelles Germany
Bahamas Dominican Republic Lebanon Sierra Leone Greece
Bahrain Ecuador Lesotho Somalia Ireland
Bangladesh Egypt Liberia South Africa Italy
Barbados El Salvador Libya Sri Lanka Japan
Belarus Eritrea Madagascar Sudan Netherlands
Belize Estonia Malawi Suriname New Zealand
Benin Ethiopia Malaysia Swaziland Norway
Bermuda Fiji Mali Syria Portugal
Bhutan Gabon Mauritania Taiwan Spain
Bolivia Gambia Mauritius Tanzania Sweden
Bosnia and Herzegovina Georgia Mexico Thailand Switzerland
Botswana Ghana Moldova Timor-Leste United States
Brazil Grenada Mongolia Togo United Kingdom
Brunei Guatemala Morocco Tonga
Burkina Faso Guinea Mozambique Trinidad and Tobago
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Myanmar Tunisia
Cambodia Guyana Namibia Turkey
Cameroon Haiti Nepal Uganda
Cape Verde Honduras Nicaragua United Arab Emirates
Central African Republic Hungary Niger Uruguay
Chad India Nigeria Venezuela
Chile Indonesia Oman Vietnam
China Iran Pakistan Yemen
Colombia Iraq Panama Zambia
Comoros Israel Paraguay Zimbabwe  38
A.2. Generalized Linear Models 
Models: Generalized  linear  models 
  Gamma  Poisson  NLS    
  xdon xdon xdon 
LYD  0.796*** 0.770*** 0.511*** 
  15.669 17.726 6.294 
LYR  0.866*** 0.703*** 0.507*** 
  34.41 20.26 11.562 
LYHD  -0.659* 0.378  1.151 
  -2.319 1.181  1.68 
LYHR  0.326*** 0.530*** 1.129*** 
  5.893 6.102 5.503 
LD  -0.956*** -0.875*** -0.756*** 
  -9.503 -13.71 -7.701 
LODAGDJ  -0.108 -0.034 0.009 
  -1.862 -0.629 0.101 
LODAGD  0.038* 0.075**  0.274*** 
  2.261 2.81  5.235 
LODAGD (-1)  0.060*** 0.068*** 0.096*     
  4.042 5.228 2.419 
LODAGD (-2)  0.087*** 0.115*** 0.083*     
  6.268 7.482 2.194 
LAMULTI  -0.055* -0.081**  -0.057*     
  -2.236 -3.057 -2.032 
LAMULTI (-1)  -0.120** -0.093***  -0.056*     
  -2.901 -4.667 -2.326 
LEXCHR  0.001 -0.003  0.013 
  0.077 -0.14 0.392 
CONTIG  -0.59 -0.361  -0.229 
  -1.081 -1.43  -0.855 
COMLANG  0.043 0.049 -0.094 
  0.367 0.398 -0.425 
COLONY  0.796*** 0.245  0.036 
  4.448 1.836 0.154 
SMCTRY  -1.089*** -0.730**  -0.884*     
  -3.31 -3.149  -2.128 
CONSTANT  -12.177** -20.592***  -23.002*** 
  -3.138 -5.972 -3.443 
NOBS  19000 19000 19000 
MILLS     19175.65 2.69E+12 3.10E+21 
DEVIANCE  1.009245 1.42E+08 1.63E+17 
DISPERS  36.549 1.42E+08  42.475 
AIC  -167710.6 2.69E+12 3.10E+21 
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices; LYD and LYR are donors’ and recipients’ 
GDPs, respectively; LYHD and LYHR are donors’ and recipients’ GDPs per capita, respectively; LD is 
distance,; LODAGDK is gross bilateral aid from other donors (different from i) to country j; LODAGD is gross 
bilateral aid from donor i to country j; and LAMULTI is imputed multilateral aid to country j. LEXCHR is the 
bilateral exchange rate at current prices;  CONTIG, COMLANG, COLONY, and SMCTRY are dummies that 
take the value 1 when countries share a border and a language, have a colonial relationship, and when i and j 
were part of the same country in the past, respectively. t-statistics are reported.  
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LYD  1.205** 1.445***  0.211  0.280 
  2.686 4.27  0.590  0.787 
LYR  -0.422* -0.497***  -0.006 -0.057 
  -2.259 -3.632  -0.036  -0.362 
LYHD  -0.981* -1.040**  -0.091 -0.194 
  -1.983 -2.74  -0.225  -0.490 
LYHR  1.617*** 1.690***  0.622***  0.615*** 
  9.033 12.72  3.673  3.781 
LODAGDJ  0.062*** 0.066***  0.033** 0.027*     
  3.786 5.307  2.578  2.153 
LEXCHR  -0.001 0.002  0  -0.003 
  -0.219 0.512  -0.114  -0.892 
LODAGD  0.099*** 0.047***  0.036***  0.035*** 
  4.401 8.015  6.16 6.989 
LODAGD (-1)    0.014*  -0.008                 
    2.393  -1.246                 
LODAGD (-2)    0.006  0                 
    1.046  -0.023                 
LODAGD^2   0.008***    0.005*** 
   5.766    3.821 
LAMULTI  0.030*** 0.023**  0.013  0.009 
  3.759 2.940  1.811  1.353 
LAMULTI (-1)    0.017*                   
    2.259                   
LXDON (-1)     0.531***  0.546*** 
     13.132  15.72 
CONSTANT    -13.060*                   
    -2.186                   
R-SQUARED  0.043 0.113  0.13 0.134 
N  14700 15732  14206  15678 
LL  -11390.41 -12512.34  -10300.74  -12057.27 
RMSE  0.551 0.563  0.526  0.550 
HANSEN Test  0.032   0.004  0.380 
HANSEN Prob.  0.858   0.949  0.538 
Endogeneity Test  4.482  
Prob.  0.0342      
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices; LYD and LYR are donors’ and recipients’ 
GDPs, respectively; LYHD and LYHR are donors’ and recipients’ GDPs per capita, respectively; LD is distance; 
LODAGDK is gross bilateral aid from other donors (different from i) to country j; LODAGD is gross bilateral 
aid from donor i to country j; and LAMULTI is imputed multilateral aid to country j. LEXCHR is the bilateral 
exchange rate at current prices,  CONTIG, COMLANG, COLONY, COL45, and SMCTRY are dummies that 
take the value 1 when countries share a border and language, have a colonial relationship, had a colonial 
relationship before 1945, and if i and j were part of the same country in the past, respectively. t-statistics are 
reported.  
 